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Incentive-based instruments use financial means, directly or indirectly, to motivate pollutersto reduce the health and environmental risks posed by their facilities, processes, or products.These instruments typically provide monetary and near-monetary rewards for polluting less,
and impose costs of various types for polluting more. According to economic theory and model-
ing exercises, incentive-based instruments such as pollution charges and tradable permits are more
cost-effective than traditional forms of regulation. Incentive-based approaches also can address
small sources of pollution such as households that are not easily controlled with traditional forms
of regulation, as well as provide a reason for polluters to improve performance relative to exist-
ing regulatory requirements. Finally, incentive-based forms of regulation can provide a stimulus
for technological change and innovation in pollution control.
Historically, environmental regulation has relied on the enforcement of regulations governing
the discharge of pollutants to the environment. That so-called “command and control” approach
worked reasonably well for the first rounds of control of large and highly visible sources of pol-
lution. As control efforts tightened, however, high costs became a more visible drawback to the
command and control approach. Regulators also noted problems in dealing with releases of pol-
lution from small industrial sources and households.
As a group, incentive-based instruments dif fer from traditional command and control re-
quirements in terms of their information and enforcement requirements, as well as institutional,
political, and other demands. Among incentive-based instruments, there is tremendous variation
in the prerequisites necessary for successful implementation.
Because of their limited resources and often-severe pollution problems, developing nations in-
creasingly are being asked to consider and implement incentive-based regulations for managing
the environment. These requests come from multilateral development organizations such as the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, as well as individual donor agencies such as US-
AID. The primary drivers of these initiatives are desires to improve the environmental ef fec-
tiveness of traditional regulatory strategies as well as to reduce compliance costs.
The range among costs per ton incurred to control pollution can vary by several orders of mag-
nitude. Pollution charges and tradable permits offer a means of improving cost-effectiveness rel-
ative to purely command and control approaches by allowing control efforts to be effectively tar-
geted where they are less costly. Air pollution in Cairo, Egypt, provides a graphic example of
inefficiency. Cairo experiences some of the highest particulate matter readings in the world. An-
nual mean readings are 5 to 10 times U.S. and World Health Organization norms (depending upon
the measure). Egyptian authorities have required electrostatic precipitators at some but not all of
the local cement plants (average cost $9 per ton of PM reduction) and begun a vehicle inspection
and maintenance and old taxi scrapping programs (average cost well over $5,000 per ton of PM
and other pollutants). For political reasons, other cheaper control measures are not under consid-
eration—such as emission controls at large state-owned steel and fer tilizer plants and elimina-
tion of subsidies for high sulfur fuel oil.
Developing countries have implemented a variety of economic incentives for managing the
environment. The variety of economic incentives in use today is one of the most remarkable de-
velopments in environmental management of the past decade. And with that variety, naturally,
come different results.
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TABLE 1
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT
INSTRUMENT EXAMPLES SITUATION WHERE INSTRUMENT WORKS BEST
Pollution charges,
taxes and fees
Emission charge: China, Central & Eastern
Europe, FSU
Effluent charge: all above plus Philippines
Sewage charge: widespread
Solid waste: widespread application
Damage caused by pollution is directly
proportional to the amount of pollution.
Monitoring data available
Input or output
charges, taxes and fees
Carbon tax: no developing countries yet
Leaded gas tax: Thailand, Philippines
Fer tilizer tax: no developing countries
Water user fee: widespread
Sewer fee: widespread
CFC tax: no developing countries
Numerous sources
No monitoring data
Damage caused by pollution is directly
proportional to the amount of pollution.




Industrial pollution control: many examples
Agricultural activity: many examples
Municipal sewage plant: many examples
Monitoring data available





Agricultural subsidies: Egypt and others
Environmental harms from the subsidies can be
documented
Political will exists to remove subsidies
Deposit-refund Beverage container: many voluntary examples,
mandatory in Korea




Tradable permits Emission: Santiago, Chile
Effluent: no developing countries
Water rights: Chile
Fisheries access: several
Few, if any, pollution “hotspots”
Precise control over amount of pollution
important
Marginal control costs vary across sources
Information provision Toxic releases: Mexico, India, others
Product characteristics: Korea, Thailand, others
Recipients understand information
Voluntary mechanisms Energy conservation: many under development
Water conservation
Pollution prevention: many cleaner production
pilot projects
Firms willing to exceed applicable standards
Liability Natural resource damage assessment: Russia,
FSU, others on case-by-case basis
Large impacts
Performance bonds Mining: Indonesia
Timber harvesting: Philippines
Specific actions desired
Fees, Charges, and Taxes
From the perspective of sources, environmental fees, charges, and taxes are largely interchange-
able in terms of their effects. Pollution may be targeted through environmental levies on inputs,
outputs, or on pollution generated by sources. Developing countries have imposed a great variety
of such levies. Levies on inputs and products generally are the simplest to collect but are more re-
moved from the actual decision to pollute, weakening the incentive.
Emission and effluent fees impose requirements on regulators and the regulated community:
■ Measurement of mass emissions or effluent
■ Setting appropriate fee level
■ Collecting amounts due, and
■ Disposition of the amounts collected
Charges on air emissions are especially difficult because of difficulties in measuring mass
emissions. Because emission standards in most nations are expressed in terms of concentrations,
not mass, only fairly crude estimating techniques normally are used to calculate payments due.
The Chinese Pollution Levy System is the most comprehensive emission charge system in the
developing world. Charges are too low to directly affect polluting behavior, however. Historically,
about three-fourths of levy payments were returned to sources for pollution control investments
and those investments are believed to have had an impact on emissions. The remainder pays for
environmental management at the local and regional level. Thus, the Chinese levy can be thought
of as a hybrid policy with a substantial subsidy component. Water effluent discharge is different
in that sampling and flow measurement are relatively inexpensive. At Laguna Lake in the Philip-
pines, a sophisticated effluent discharge fee system with high fee levels has proven effective in
limiting BOD discharge.
Charges are sometimes levied on products—e.g., chlorofluorocarbons, low-efficiency auto-
mobiles, fer tilizer, motor oil, and packaging—that are believed to have harmful effects on the en-
vironment. Other fees are charged for activities that are potentially damaging to the environment.
Gasoline taxes in Thailand and the Philippines that differentiate between leaded and unleaded are
an example.
Subsidies for Pollution Control
Two types of environmentally-related subsidies are noted: monetary payments to encourage en-
vironmentally friendly actions; and existing subsidies for energy, water, and other resources that
have environmentally harmful consequences.
Subsidies to support reductions in pollution take many forms. Among the subsidies that are
used at all levels of government to help manage environmental pollution are grants, low-interest
loans, favorable tax treatment, and preferential procurement policies for products believed to pose
relatively low environmental risks. Subsidies are used to suppor t private-sector pollution pre-
vention and control activities, the cleanup of contaminated industrial sites, farming and land
preservation, consumer product waste management, alternative automobile fuels, clean-running
cars, and municipal wastewater treatment.
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Subsidies for environmental management are sometimes criticized because the government
entity—and, ultimately, the taxpayer—providing the subsidy is helping to bear the costs that
should be the responsibility of the polluter. However, sometimes the subsidy is paired with a tax,
leaving the taxpayer burden unchanged. Other environmentally related subsidies, such as federal
support for timber harvesting in the national forests, also are criticized because they have proven
harmful to the environment. Nonetheless, subsidies have become a fairly common tool to man-
age the environment at every level of government.
Eliminating environmentally harmful subsidies can be even more effective when used to im-
prove environmental quality. In the early 1990s, the World Bank made the phaseout of pesticide
subsidies a condition for new lending to Egypt. The GOE agreed, and the use of pesticides dropped
by nearly 70% over the next five years.
Deposit-Refund Systems
Deposit-refund systems require a monetary deposit at the time of sale of a product. The deposit
is returned when the item is returned at the end of its useful life. In the United States, deposit-re-
fund systems have been applied most widely to help control the disposal of lead-acid bat teries,
but they also are being applied in some states to products such as aluminum and glass cans, pes-
ticide containers, and tires. When used products are valuable, as is currently the case for lead-acid
batteries, the private sector often creates and manages a disposal system. Regardless of who man-
ages the disposal of such products, the fees charged by this system help subsidize the return of re-
cyclable products.
Deposit-refund systems appear to be most appropriate for discrete, solid commodities such as
beverage containers, bat teries, and car bodies that would cause environmental harm through their
improper disposal. Government-mandated deposit systems for less discrete substances, like air
and water pollutants, have not been at tempted. One factor that limits the widespread use of de-
posit-refund systems is their high cost of implementation. Collecting and refunding deposits on
the sale of individual products such as beverage containers tends to be expensive, and additional
costs are involved in collecting and returning used products for disposal.
Among middle-income countries, South Korea has one of the most extensive deposit systems
in terms of items covered. Under a 1991 amendment to its Solid Waste Management Act, South
Korea introduced a comprehensive deposit program affecting packaged paper, metal cans, glass
and PET bottles, bat teries, tires, lubricating oils, televisions, and washing machines.
Performance bonds
Performance bonds are fees levied upon companies that extract cer tain natural resources, such as
timber, coal, oil, and gas, and on construction activities. Amounts deposited as the performance
bond can be refunded when the payer fulfills certain obligations. In that sense, a performance bond
acts like a deposit-refund system.
While performance bonds give companies an economic incentive to reclaim mining sites, fol-
low logging regulations, and perform construction activities in compliance with applicable rules,
they are backed up by what might be a stronger incentive. A firm’s ability to obtain future min-
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eral leases, timber harvesting contracts, or construction permits is dependent in large part on sat-
isfying today’s regulatory requirements.
The People’s Republic of China uses a performance bond to ensure compliance with its “three
simultaneous” policy. The policy seeks to have projects designed, constructed, and operated in
compliance with all environmental regulations. The use of performance bonds to ensure financial
responsibility is overseen by the Ministry of Finance or by the relevant economic sector institu-
tion. The People’s Republic of China has limited experience with performance bonding to ensure
sufficient financial resources for environmental management. In the case of the “three simultane-
ous,” the bond is intended to guarantee that an enterprise designs, builds, and operates its pollu-
tion control facilities in a manner that’s consistent with applicable regulatory requirements.
Provincial and local environmental protection bureaus administer the bond.
Beginning in 1997, Indonesia’s Director General of Mining required mine operators to post a
reclamation guarantee reflecting the value of the potential environmental damage the mining op-
eration could cause. The amount of the guarantee is set at the estimated reclamation cost should
the damage be caused. The Indonesian government refunds the guarantee upon satisfactory per-
formance by the operator.
Beginning in 1991, the Philippines used a Forest Guarantee Bond (a returnable performance
bond) to encourage responsible long-term management by leaseholders, offer a means for promptly
penalizing lessees if there is a violation of the agreement, and provide a market-based measure
of profitability of a forest lease with harvesting rights by having would-be leaseholders bid against
one another for the right. The government set a floor price for leases that approximated 10% of
the value of the standing timber. The government suspended the scheme in 1995 after it was clear
that the bid amounts were not sufficient to discourage clear-cut ting and did not produce the de-
sired investments in planting and protecting forests. Instead, the bonds simply were forfeited.
Marketable Permits
The general principle of emissions trading systems is that sources may satisfy their obligations
by one of two means: (1) limiting the releases of pollution to no more than the permit ted amount,
or (2) releasing more (or less) than the permit ted amount and exchanging credits representing any
deficiency (or surplus) in the quantity of emissions. Producers with average incremental costs of
pollution control are likely to meet their obligations without trading. Producers with relatively
high incremental control costs are likely to be buyers of pollution reduction credits; sources with
relatively low incremental costs of control are likely to be sellers of excess credits. The broad ob-
jective of emissions trading is to lower the total costs of achieving a given environmental goal.
Emission trading has a number of technical and regulatory requirements that have limited its
application in developing countries:
■ the legal and regulatory framework, including the delineation of the roles and responsibilities
of the different parties (regulators, emission sources, and others);
■ the overall cap on emissions and the decision of which sources to include;
■ the determination of emission quotas;
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■ timing and spatial issues, such as how long the program will run, whether credits can be saved
in one period and used in subsequent periods, and whether there will be adjustments to account
for differences in the environmental impact of emissions from different locations;
■ the mechanism (or mechanisms) for measuring emissions (of ten a sophisticated and costly
continuous emission monitoring device); and
■ tracking and enforcement requirements.
These requirements are considerably more challenging than the requirements for emission fees.
Not only is greater precision of measurement desired (since sources will be buying and selling
these quantities), but determining initial allocations, tracking needs, and whether to allow bank-
ing creates additional regulatory burdens.
While the United States has considerable experience with emission trading, there are rela-
tively few other examples elsewhere in the world. Germany has an offset program that allows new
sources to be located in areas with poor air quality without causing fur ther deterioration in air
quality. Santiago, Chile, established a program in tradable particulate credits in 1992. A 1993 re-
vision of Taipei, Taiwan’s Air Pollution Control Act included provisions under which individual
sources may be exempted from emission standards if they can control sufficient amounts of the
same types of emissions elsewhere in the same air pollution control region. Slovakia has estab-
lished the foundation for trading in SO2 emissions, with actual trading not slated for another cou-
ple of years. Ontario Canada, has a pilot emission reduction trading program dating from 1997
that includes VOC, SO2, CO2, and NOx. At least two emission trading programs are under de-
velopment in the People’s Republic of China: nationwide trading of SO2 emissions from electric
utilities, pat terned af ter the U.S. Acid Rain program; and trading of SO2 emission reduction re-
quirements in the city of Taiyuan (Shanxi Province). Many countries have star ted to design pro-
grams in tradable greenhouse gas emission credits.
Liability
Liability for damage to human health and the environment can be a powerful incentive to en-
courage corporations to engage in safe environmental practices, as well as to compensate those
who are injured. If polluters are liable (and must pay) for the damage they cause, they will con-
trol pollution to the point where the marginal pollution damage equals the marginal costs of con-
trol. At this point, their total payments for controlling pollution and compensating victims are
minimized. Liability can take two forms: civil law and common law. Civil liability is expressly
writ ten into law.
Many environmental statutes worldwide have civil liability provisions, though environmen-
tal liability actions in developing countries are relatively rare. Jurisdiction is one problem: Should
a case be brought in the developing country where the spill occurred or in the home country of
the concern that had the spill? As the example here illustrates, there is no universal rule regard-
ing jurisdiction. Moreover, in some cases, individuals harmed by spills are not compensated due
to unclear liability rules or inadequate financial guarantees prior to the star t of operations.
On April 4, 1996 Cunard Lines’ Royal Viking Sun strayed from course and ran into a coral reef
off Tiran Island near Ras Mohammed in the Red Sea. Before the vessel was freed, it damaged ap-
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proximately 2,000 square meters of reef. Egyptian authorities impounded the vessel and demanded
$23.5 million in compensation for lost tourism revenues and damage to the environment. Cunard
Lines settled for that amount (equivalent to more than $10,000 per square meter of reef).
A more comprehensive review would reveal that pursuing liability claims is very costly and
the outcome is highly uncertain. This argues that liability is most appropriate only for large in-
cidents and not routine polluting activities. Second, smaller and under-capitalized enterprises may
find bankruptcy an at tractive option in the event of a large pollution incident. Consequently, per-
formance bonding or some other type of guarantee may be desirable for enterprises that have the
potential to cause significant environmental harm.
Information Disclosure
The collection and public availability of information on environmental performance has proven
to be a strong incentive for producers to reduce their emissions of pollution. The incentive derives
from a number of factors. For example, when companies collect emissions information, they learn
about the nature and magnitude of their emissions. When such information is made easily acces-
sible to the public, workers and local communities have a much bet ter idea of the environmental
risks they face, so they are more prone to support or demand actions to reduce emissions. When
a source’s emissions are shown to decline over time, the source often reaps the benefits of bet ter
relationships with its employees and with the local community. Finally, in some cases, a proven,
long-term record of environmental stewardship makes a company’s products more desirable to con-
sumers. Information disclosure takes several forms in developing countries: pollution release and
transfer reporting, color-coding of firms, and product labeling. Color-coding will be discussed briefly.
In Indonesia, the Environmental Impact Management Agency created the Program for Pollu-
tion Control, Evaluation, and Rating (PROPER) to rate factories on their compliance with national
wastewater discharge standards, then disclose the ratings to the public. PROPER uses five color
categories to rate environmental performance: gold for firms that use best technology and reduce
pollution to 5% of the national standard, green for firms that reduce pollution to 50% of national
standards, blue for compliance with national standards, red for firms that fail to meet national stan-
dards, and black for those without pollution controls.
Formal as well as informal sanctions apply, depending upon the color class. For example, the
Indonesian stock exchange will not list securities of firms that fall short of the blue classification.
Cultural factors, such as shame avoidance and citizen lawsuits, also play a role in motivating pol-
luters. Evidence suggests that this system is influencing behavior. In the first survey in June 1995,
35.3% of the 187 factories were in compliance with the government’s water pollution regulations.
Two years later, 49.2% of the factories were in compliance.
Similar programs are being developed in the Philippines, Mexico, Columbia, and the People’s
Republic of China.
Voluntary Actions
Voluntary pollution control programs are increasingly common in developed countries as regu-
lators seek ways to motivate firms to go beyond compliance with existing environmental regu-
lations. One example is cited here. Under Indonesia’s PROKASIH (or Clean Rivers Program),
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the largest polluters are encouraged to sign agreements to reduce pollution by specific amounts
over a specific time period. In the first 2.5 years af ter the star t of the program, about 1,000 pol-
luters signed agreements, the majority of which took measures to reduce pollution. The govern-
ment has released information on which signatories have complied and which have not and en-
couraged press coverage of signatories’ per formance under the program. Such a voluntary
approach is distinct from the information-based approach described earlier since firms were not
required to par ticipate in the program initially. Those who do not par ticipate receive no public-
ity. Those who join the program and follow through on commitments receive a reward in the
form of a public commendation. Only those who fail to follow through on their commitments re-
ceive adverse publicity.
Conclusions
A wide variety of incentive-based programs are used in developing countries to help manage the
environment. The institutional and administrative requirements of dif fering approaches vary
greatly from one program to another. Pollutant trading imposes demands for pollutant dispersion
modeling, monitoring, tracking, and enforcement that exceed capabilities in all but a handful of
developing countries. Fees on pollution are much simpler to impose, though rarely are they seen
at levels high enough to affect behavior. Liability also is unat tractive as a means of controlling
routine releases. However, many other incentive-based management tools have been implemented
successfully in the developing world and this trend is continuing unabated.
Compromises of ten are necessary when policies are implemented. Emissions might not be
measured directly, for example, implying that emission fees are based on estimates. Government
agencies may own the most highly polluting factories, making enforcement of incentive-based as
well as more traditional regulations problematic. Private sector enterprises may be regulated
lightly or not at all if there is corruption, cronyism, or weak government institutions. Such situa-
tions would make it difficult to implement emission fees, for example. When direct control of pol-
lution is difficult or impossible, removing subsidies and get ting prices right can be an effective
response, as market forces push the enterprises to modernize or close altogether. This approach
requires political will—something that can be augmented through information campaigns and pol-
lution reporting to garner popular support. External drivers also can be helpful—such as when
lending by international institutions comes with conditional terms for price or subsidy adjustments.
Often the most effective incentive-based programs are tightly integrated with command and
control measures. China’s pollution levy system builds upon a system of emission and effluent
limits. Initially, only releases in excess of specified concentrations were subject to the levy. To
make the pollution levy more effective, China is moving away from concentration-based discharge
limits and toward mass-based permit ting. The process is taking many years, star ting first with
mass-based effluent charges and only recently adding mass-based charges for sulfur dioxide. De-
vising acceptable means to measure mass emissions and the at tendant increase in regulatory bur-
dens have slowed the process.
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